You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
chore(deps): update dependency read-yaml-file>js-yaml to v3.15.2 [security] (v2) - #8884
A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.
Details
The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:
storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.
When input is of the form:
a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}
When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does
sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}
Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:
one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination
Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.
YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.
PoC
Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.
Impact
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.
Suggested fix:
Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:
dedupe in storeMappingPair:
if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}
js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:
For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.
Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.
Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)
Summary
resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.
!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.
This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.
Affected versions
Line
Latest tested
Status
3.x
3.15.0
Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x
4.3.0
Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x
5.2.2
Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)
Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.
objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly 1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.
The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):
if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)
Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).
Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.
Impact
Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.
Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.
Suggested fix
Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:
This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.
lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema
Discovery
Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.
maxTotalMergeKeys does not count empty mappings. An attacker can repeatedly merge a large sequence of them and consume significant CPU without reaching the configured limit.
Example
arr: &arr [{}, {}, {}, ...] # N empty mappingstargets:
- <<: *arr # repeated K times
For every target, the loader iterates all N elements of arr. This results in O(N * K) work while totalMergeKeys remains unchanged.
Merging this PR will not cause a version bump for any packages. If these changes should not result in a new version, you're good to go. If these changes should result in a version bump, you need to add a changeset.
💥 An error occurred when fetching the changed packages and changesets in this PR
Some errors occurred when validating the changesets config:
fixed: Invalid group: The package or glob "lib1" is defined in multiple groups of fixed packages. Packages can only be belong to a single group. Note that glob expressions must be defined according to https://npmx.dev/picomatch.
fixed: Invalid group: The package or glob "lib2" is defined in multiple groups of fixed packages. Packages can only be belong to a single group. Note that glob expressions must be defined according to https://npmx.dev/picomatch.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This PR contains the following updates:
3.14.2→3.15.2JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases
CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
More information
Details
Summary
A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in
js-yamlmerge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.
Details
The issue is in merge handling inside
lib/loader.js:storeMappingPair(...)iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag istag:yaml.org,2002:merge.mergeMappings(...).mergeMappings(...)computesObject.keys(source)and performs_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)checks for each key.When input is of the form:
a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)
Root cause
File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366
When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does
Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:
Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.
YAML semantics for
<<:are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.
PoC
Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.
Impact
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.
Suggested fix:
Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:
dedupe in storeMappingPair:
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption
CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
More information
Details
Impact
js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:
For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.
PoC
From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)
Patches
Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported
GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
More information
Details
Quadratic CPU consumption in
!!omapresolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)Summary
resolveYamlOmap()enforces key uniqueness for!!omapsequences with a linearscan (
objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolutionO(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside
yaml.load(), giving a denial of serviceagainst any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.
!!omapis registered in the default schema(
lib/schema/default.js→require('../type/omap')), so a plainyaml.load(untrustedInput)with no options is affected — no custom schema ornon-default configuration is required.
This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.
Affected versions
objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)atlib/type/omap.js:29objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)atlib/type/omap.js:30Set)Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.
Details
lib/type/omap.js(js-yaml 4.3.0):objectKeysgrows by one element per entry, andArray.prototype.indexOfis alinear scan, so resolving an
n-entry!!omapperforms roughly1 + 2 + … + ncomparisons — quadratic inn. The work happens synchronouslyinside
yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a
Set(
src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):Proof of concept
Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)
js-yaml 4.3.0
js-yaml 3.15.0
Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of
n, which is thesignature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).
Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load()for 10.8 seconds.Impact
Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.
Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.
Suggested fix
Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a
Set:This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A
maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but theSetmatches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.References
lib/type/omap.js(3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolverlib/schema/default.js— registers!!omapin the default schemaDiscovery
Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
js-yaml: maxTotalMergeKeys does not limit CPU use for empty merge sources
CVE-2026-84375 / GHSA-2883-xcg3-v3hh
More information
Details
Summary
maxTotalMergeKeysdoes not count empty mappings. An attacker can repeatedly merge a large sequence of them and consume significant CPU without reaching the configured limit.Example
For every target, the loader iterates all
Nelements ofarr. This results inO(N * K)work whiletotalMergeKeysremains unchanged.PoC
Observed results:
Impact
An attacker can submit a relatively small YAML document that causes prolonged CPU consumption despite the default
maxTotalMergeKeyslimit.Fix
Count each merge-source mapping as one budget unit, in addition to counting its keys.
Difference with v5
In v3 & v4, merge is enabled by default. So, the severity score is higher.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
nodeca/js-yaml (read-yaml-file>js-yaml)
v3.15.2Compare Source
v3.15.1Compare Source
v3.15.0Compare Source
Security
maxTotalMergeKeysoption.Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.