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docs: Add SECURITY.md - #864
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| 2. **Supply chain:** Source and build dependencies fetched at build or install time may be compromised, outdated or unpinned. | ||
| 3. **Network exposure:** When deployed behind a network-facing server, endpoints may be reachable by untrusted clients. This component does not by itself provide authentication, authorization or encryption. | ||
| 4. **Resource exhaustion:** Oversized or numerous requests may consume memory, compute or other resources and degrade availability. | ||
| 5. **Information disclosure:** Logs, metrics and error messages may reveal sensitive data such as paths, identifiers or request content. |
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lora_task_id. Restoring the single-tenant or tenant-isolation assumption would help operators avoid treating an authenticated shared deployment as sufficient protection.
How this was verified: The LoRA documentation says subsequent requests can use a cached adapter by supplying only its task ID.
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| 1. **Untrusted input:** Requests, models, configuration or data supplied to this component may be malformed or malicious, and could cause crashes, memory errors or unintended behavior if not validated. | ||
| 2. **Supply chain:** Source and build dependencies fetched at build or install time may be compromised, outdated or unpinned. | ||
| 3. **Network exposure:** When deployed behind a network-facing server, endpoints may be reachable by untrusted clients. This component does not by itself provide authentication, authorization or encryption. |
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How this was verified: The deployment documentation supports MPI-based orchestrator operation across nodes, while the new assumption names only a trusted environment or gateway.
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| ## Critical Security Assumptions | ||
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| * The component is deployed in a trusted environment or behind a gateway that provides authentication, authorization, TLS and rate limiting. | ||
| * Models, configuration and other inputs come from trusted sources. |
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How this was verified: Repository documentation shows external model downloads and tokenizer loading during Triton model initialization.
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What does the PR do?
SECURITY.md, which this repository did not have. Flagged by an AIVO asset review.NVIDIA/NeMo,cuda-pythonandMegatron-LM. Text is NVIDIA-authored, unmodified except the platform-neutral "GitHub/GitLab" wording fromcuda-python.Checklist
<commit_type>: <Title>Commit Type:
Check the conventional commit type
box here and add the label to the github PR.
Related PRs:
Where should the reviewer start?
SECURITY.md— compare againstNVIDIA/NeMo/SECURITY.mdfor the canonical wording.Test plan:
Documentation only; no code paths affected.
CI Pipeline ID:
Caveats:
NVIDIA/NeMosays "through GitHub",NVIDIA/cuda-pythonsays "through GitHub/GitLab". This PR uses the latter because Triton repositories exist on both GitHub and internal GitLab.Background
An AIVO asset review (securityportal.nvidia.com/aivo/assets) flagged Triton repositories with no SECURITY.md. Rather than authoring per-repository security documentation, every repository adopts NVIDIA's current standard template so the policy is identical everywhere and carries no repository-specific claims to maintain.
Related Issues: (use one of the action keywords Closes / Fixes / Resolves / Relates to)