ci: wire the seidroid review workflow

.github/workflows/seidroid.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+# Wiring only. The review logic lives in sei-protocol/uci and the reviewer binary in
+# sei-protocol/sei-internal-skills; both document their own behaviour and inputs.
+#
+#   @seidroid review                  review this pull request
+#   @seidroid review close            destroy this pull request's session now
+#
+# A review request is read from a top-level comment, an inline review comment or a
+# review body. A teardown is read from a top-level comment only.
+#
+# Four things here diverge from this repository's other workflows on purpose. Each is
+# commented where it appears: the sha pin below, the lowercase `name:`, the empty
+# top-level `permissions:`, and the absence of a `concurrency:` block.
+#
+# The `uses:` lines pin a raw commit sha, where uci-lint.yml, uci-release-check.yml,
+# uci-release-publish.yml and uci-stale-check.yml each pin a uci tag. That is
+# availability, not preference: this callee is on no uci tag and on no uci default
+# branch -- the workflow file has no history on uci's `main` -- so there is no tag to
+# name. Every other repository wiring this reviewer pins the same sha, and this file is
+# bumped with them by path, so keep the three occurrences below identical.
+#
+# Lowercase, where this repository Title-Cases (`Go Linter`, `Releaser`, `Stale
+# Checker`). `seidroid review` is the literal command a person types, and the callee
+# sets `run-name: UCI / seidroid review / #<n>`; Title-Casing it would put this
+# workflow's name at odds with its own trigger phrase and with every other caller.
+name: seidroid review
+
+on:
+  issue_comment:
+    types: [created]
+  # The two review events as well, so `@seidroid review` reaches the pipeline when it
+  # is typed where the discussion already is -- inside an inline diff thread or in a
+  # review body, rather than only on the conversation. Convenience, not capability: a
+  # top-level `issue_comment` already asks for a re-review of the current tree. The
+  # callee admits both events by name and applies the same author checks to them.
+  # Wired here after platform, which added them first.
+  pull_request_review_comment:
+    types: [created]
+  pull_request_review:
+    types: [submitted]
+  pull_request:
+    types: [opened, ready_for_review, synchronize, reopened, closed]
+
+# Empty, where this repository's other workflows grant scopes at the top level. A
+# reusable workflow may only downgrade what its caller granted, so the caller sets the
+# ceiling. Sufficient inherited permissions would serve too; the choice here is to grant
+# the required scopes explicitly rather than depend on a configured default. Empty at the
+# top means no job inherits one, and each job then states exactly the scopes the callee's
+# two jobs declare between them, so what this caller grants does not move with whichever
+# GITHUB_TOKEN default the organisation or the repository has set.
+permissions: {}
+
+# No `concurrency:` block, where all four uci callers in this repository set one with
+# `cancel-in-progress: true`. Three reasons, in order:
+#
+#   - The callee already groups the way we would. Its review job carries its own
+#     job-level `concurrency`, keyed on mode + repository + pull request number with
+#     `cancel-in-progress: true`, so a newer `@seidroid review` cancels an in-flight
+#     review while a teardown for the same pull request sits in a separate group and
+#     survives. A caller group on top of that could only narrow it.
+#   - The grouping a caller would reach for first is the wrong one. A workflow-and-pull
+#     request group with no mode in the key would put the review job and the reclaim job
+#     together, so a review arriving on a just-closed pull request could cancel an
+#     in-flight reclaim -- and `mode: close` is the path that reclaims a session's
+#     sandbox. Mode has to stay in the key, and the callee already keeps it there.
+#   - Cancelling a review frees nothing, and stops less than the word suggests.
+#     Cancellation unwinds the driver without deleting the session: the conversation
+#     stays, the sandbox stays allocated until something reclaims it, and the remote
+#     turn may keep running -- the next request queues behind that turn rather than
+#     racing it. So a caller-level `cancel-in-progress` would buy latency, not
+#     reclamation. `mode: close` is the explicit end-of-work path that reclaims the
+#     sandbox. Close is not the only code path that can delete a session -- opening a
+#     review deletes and replaces one it finds unable to run a turn at all -- but that
+#     repairs an already-dead session rather than ending a live unit of work, so it is
+#     not a teardown a caller can schedule.
+#
+# What the callee's grouping is NOT: exactly-once, or a session lifecycle. A push and a
+# comment can each admit a review of the same tree; overlapping runs cancel, sequential
+# requests are not deduplicated. Review and close sit in separate groups by design, and
+# the comment path does not test whether the pull request is already closed.
+jobs:
+  seidroid-review:
+    # Substring tests, with the teardown phrase excluded here so `@seidroid review
+    # close` asks for exactly one thing. The callee does not match substrings: it
+    # requires a whole LINE reading `@seidroid review [close]`, and it never checks the
+    # line it parsed against `mode`. A body mixing both commands can therefore route to
+    # the wrong one -- the PR description carries the case that matters. Not fixable
+    # here: GitHub expressions have no regex, so a caller-side grammar would trade one
+    # set of wrong answers for another, and the only reader that can compare a parsed
+    # line to `mode` is the callee.
+    if: >-
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
+        github.event.action != 'closed') ||
+      (((github.event_name == 'issue_comment' &&
+          github.event.issue.pull_request != null) ||
+        github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' ||
+        github.event_name == 'pull_request_review') &&
+        contains(github.event.comment.body || github.event.review.body,
+          '@seidroid review') &&
+        !contains(github.event.comment.body || github.event.review.body,
+          '@seidroid review close'))
+    uses: sei-protocol/uci/.github/workflows/seidroid-review.yml@d895e04ea5aacc796c6655d4c82a3ac7271fb04d
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+      checks: write
+      issues: write
+    secrets:
+      OMNIGENT_MACHINE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.OMNIGENT_MACHINE_CLIENT_SECRET }}
+      SEIDROID_APP_ID: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_CODE_AGENT_APP_ID }}
+      SEIDROID_APP_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_CODE_AGENT_APP_PK }}
+    with:
+      mode: review
+      # A choice for this repository, not something inherited with the file: on a clean
+      # conclusion the callee ATTEMPTS an approving review. Where the API reports a 422
+      # it attempts a COMMENT review instead; a refusal that arrives any other way -- a
+      # 403 from an approval policy, say -- gets no second attempt, and a post that does
+      # not succeed leaves a warning. So this input buys an attempt, not a guaranteed
+      # approval. Whether an approval that does land counts toward a required one is a
+      # matter of branch policy and reviewer eligibility, neither of which this file
+      # decides. Revisit this line when that policy changes.
+      approve-on-success: true
+      allowed-team: 'sei-protocol/sei-core'
+      # Unset reads REVIEW.md, which this repository does not keep.
+      guidelines-file: CLAUDE.md
+
+  # Anchored, unlike the review job's `contains`, and what that buys is narrow: a body
+  # whose first characters are not the teardown phrase does not select this job, so the
+  # phrase occurring LATER in a body does not start a teardown from here. It buys
+  # nothing else -- a body that begins with the phrase routes here whatever follows it,
+  # which is the case the PR description records. The review job stays on `contains` for
+  # fleet parity; re-anchoring it would not have prevented that case in any event, since
+  # it already excludes itself there.
+  seidroid-review-close:
+    if: >-
+      github.event_name == 'issue_comment' &&
+      github.event.issue.pull_request != null &&
+      startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '@seidroid review close')
+    uses: sei-protocol/uci/.github/workflows/seidroid-review.yml@d895e04ea5aacc796c6655d4c82a3ac7271fb04d
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+      checks: write
+      issues: write
+    secrets:
+      OMNIGENT_MACHINE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.OMNIGENT_MACHINE_CLIENT_SECRET }}
+      SEIDROID_APP_ID: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_CODE_AGENT_APP_ID }}
+      SEIDROID_APP_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_CODE_AGENT_APP_PK }}
+    with:
+      # Deletes the review session and reclaims its sandbox. It does not close the
+      # pull request.
+      mode: close
+      allowed-team: 'sei-protocol/sei-core'
+
+  # Does not cover a fork: GitHub withholds secrets from a `pull_request` run whose head
+  # is a fork, so this close cannot mint a credential. What that leaves is narrower than
+  # it looks -- the callee refuses a review on a fork-originated pull request from every
+  # trigger, so no routine path creates a session for one, and this covers a pre-existing
+  # session created outside these guarded review paths rather than a leak this wiring
+  # causes. Where one does exist, `@seidroid review close` reclaims it; the
+  # guard takes a teardown only from an author it admits as OWNER, MEMBER or COLLABORATOR,
+  # so ask an admitted collaborator or a maintainer if your own association is not one.
+  seidroid-review-reclaim:
+    if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
+    uses: sei-protocol/uci/.github/workflows/seidroid-review.yml@d895e04ea5aacc796c6655d4c82a3ac7271fb04d
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+      checks: write
+      issues: write
+    secrets:
+      OMNIGENT_MACHINE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.OMNIGENT_MACHINE_CLIENT_SECRET }}
+      SEIDROID_APP_ID: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_CODE_AGENT_APP_ID }}
+      SEIDROID_APP_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_CODE_AGENT_APP_PK }}
+    with:
+      mode: close