ChainWard has not had an external security audit yet. What that covers, and what it doesn't:
- No custom smart contracts. ChainWard deploys no contracts of its own. Attestations are made through the audited EAS contracts on Base (see docs/ATTEST.md); the BNB Chain port will use the EAS-compatible BNB Attestation Service.
- No custody. ChainWard never holds user funds. Payments (x402 checks, datasets, briefs) are USDC transfers straight to the treasury, verified on-chain before anything is delivered.
- What holds keys: the attestation signer (
0x5edc6276B89CC185aC8D6A7eCfdE076e1ACf50DF) lives only in the indexer, in a Kubernetes secret. It can attest and revoke; it cannot move funds. - Most recent internal review: 2026-10-01 (commit
4dbbfe8): SSRF hardening on alert delivery, rate limiting, the x402 payment gate, the web proxy, CSP, and payment-replay checks. Fixes are listed in that commit message. - Planned: an external review of the attestation signer and the public API is budgeted in the BNB Chain grant proposal (milestone 3).
Please report security issues privately: email hello@chainward.ai, DM @SaltCx on X, or open a GitHub security advisory. Don't open a public issue for anything exploitable.