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RPIP-87 Review #407

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14 changes: 7 additions & 7 deletions RPIPs/RPIP-87.md
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Expand Up @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ rpip: 87
title: pDAO Parameter Guardrail Revisions
description: Adjust multiple pDAO protocol parameters to remove unnecessary restrictions and improve protocol security.
author: knoshua (@knoshua)
discussions-to: https://dao.rocketpool.net/t/rpip-pdao-parameter-guardrail-revisions/4010
status: Draft
discussions-to: " https://dao.rocketpool.net/t/rpip-pdao-parameter-guardrail-revisions/4010"
status: Review
type: Protocol
category (*only required for Protocol ): Core
created: 2026-07-15
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### `proposal.quorum`

This parameter controls the minimum share of the vote power required to participate in a vote for it to pass. It is currently set to 15%, so the lower guardrail of 15% leaves no room to lower it. A lower`proposal.quorum` is not inherently insecure, so this proposal lowers the lower guardrail to 10%.
This parameter controls the minimum share of voting power required for a vote to pass. It is currently set to 15%, so the 15% lower guardrail leaves no room to change it. A lower `proposal.quorum` is not inherently insecure, so this proposal lowers the lower guardrail to 10%.

On the other hand, if a pDAO vote increases `proposal.quorum`, all future votes, including votes to lower `proposal.quorum` again, will need to meet that higher `proposal.quorum`, so there is a risk of pDAO governance being disabled until this parameter can be fixed with a smart contract upgrade. 75% of vote power participating appears very difficult to reach based on historical vote participation, so this proposal lowers the upper guardrail to 30%.
On the other hand, if a pDAO vote increases `proposal.quorum`, all future votes, including votes to lower `proposal.quorum` again, will need to meet that higher `proposal.quorum`, so there is a risk of pDAO governance being disabled until this parameter can be fixed with a smart contract upgrade. Based on historical vote participation, reaching 75% of vote power is very difficult, so this proposal lowers the upper guardrail to 30%.

### `proposal.veto.quorum`

Expand All @@ -67,15 +67,15 @@ This parameter controls how much ETH is reserved for rETH burns rather than bein

### `reduced.bond`

This parameter controls the bond requirement per validator beyond the first few (currently 2) validators, controlled by `base_bond_array`. This proposal links the upper guardrail directly to the last value of `base_bond_array`. The raised lower guardrail is introduced in [RPIP-79](RPIP-79.md).
This parameter controls the bond requirement per validator beyond the first few (currently 2) validators, controlled by `base_bond_array`. This proposal links the upper guardrail directly to the last value of `base_bond_array`. [RPIP-79](RPIP-79.md) introduces the raised lower guardrail.

### `megapool.time.before.dissolve`

This parameter controls the time that must be waited after a first deposit before a megapool validator can be dissolved. Because the Cantina audit added a 60-day upper guardrail, we had to apply a hotfix to set this to 365 days via a smart contract upgrade shortly after the Saturn 1 launch. This proposal removes the unnecessary upper guardrail.
This parameter controls the time that must be waited after a first deposit before a megapool validator can be dissolved. Because the Cantina audit added a 60-day upper guardrail, we applied a hotfix to set this to 365 days via a smart contract upgrade shortly after the Saturn 1 launch. This proposal removes the unnecessary upper guardrail.

### `upgradeveto.quorum`

This parameter controls the minimum share of the Security Council necessary to veto a contract upgrade. It is currently set to 33%, so the lower guardrail of 33% leaves no room to lower it. A lower `upgradeveto.quorum` is not inherently insecure, so this proposal lowers the lower guardrail to 10%.
This parameter controls the minimum Security Council share required to veto a contract upgrade. It is currently set to 33%, so the lower guardrail of 33% leaves no room to lower it. A lower `upgradeveto.quorum` is not inherently insecure, so this proposal lowers the lower guardrail to 10%.

## Copyright

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