fix(sqlite): bind template values positionally to prevent SQL injection

[baima365-web]

What does this PR do?

SQLiteQueryHandle.run was using $apply to forward positional parameters, which let attacker-controlled objects/arrays override trusted bindings.

Problem

const attackerId = JSON.parse('{"0": 2, "1": "bob"}'); // attacker-controlled
await sql`SELECT * FROM docs WHERE id = ${attackerId} AND tenant = ${serverTenant}`;
// before: [{id:2, tenant:"bob", body:"B-secret"}]  (trusted tenant filter overridden)

Fix

Check if values is array and bind positionally instead of using $apply. This prevents objects/arrays from being misinterpreted as named binding maps.

Fixes #35950

[claude]

Claude Code Review

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[robobun]

Thanks for the report and for the fix. The same change landed on main in #35950: SQLiteQueryHandle.run now hands the positional values to bun:sqlite as a single array instead of spreading them, so an object or array interpolated as a value can no longer rebind the other parameters (the query in your example now throws bun:sqlite's "Binding expected string, TypedArray, boolean, number, bigint or null" TypeError). That PR also added tests for the tagged template, sql.unsafe() and sql() helper paths. It will be in the next release.

Closing this one as superseded by #35950.