fix(security): enforce note edit access on PDF derive-page - #1063
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POST /api/sources/pdf/.../derive-page accepted an arbitrary noteId without checking membership, allowing authenticated users to inject pages into notes they cannot edit. Mirror POST /api/pages permission checks when noteId is set. Also correct zedi_remove_page_from_note MCP description: after issue #823 the endpoint soft-deletes the page; there is no unlink-only mode. Co-authored-by: akimasa.sugai <akimasa.sugai@saedgewell.com>
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Summary
Critical bug investigation (triggered by PR #1062) found a permission bypass in the PDF derive-page API. This PR adds the missing note edit check and corrects a misleading MCP tool description that could cause accidental page deletion.
Bug and impact
PDF derive-page authorization bypass
POST /api/sources/pdf/:sourceId/highlights/:highlightId/derive-pageaccepted an optionalnoteIdin the request body but never verified that the caller could edit that note. Any authenticated user who owned a PDF highlight could create a page inside another user's note by supplying the victim'snoteId.Impact: Cross-note content injection — pages appear in notes the attacker does not belong to.
Trigger scenario:
POST .../derive-pagewith{ "noteId": "<victim-note-uuid>", "title": "injected" }.owner_id = attackerbutnote_id = victim note.Root cause
POST /api/pagesgainedgetNoteRole+canEditchecks when an explicitnote_idis provided, but the PDF derive-page route (added in #858) was never updated. A comment deferred the check ("将来 import で共有してもよい").Fix
noteIdis explicitly provided on derive-page, require edit access viagetNoteRole+canEdit(same pattern asPOST /api/pages).zedi_remove_page_from_noteMCP tool description: after issue 既存個人ページをデフォルトノートに移行し note_pages を廃止する (default note PR 1b) #823, the API soft-deletes the page; there is no unlink-only mode. Prevents MCP agents from treating the tool as a safe unlink.Validation
server/api/src/__tests__/routes/pdfSources.test.ts— asserts 403 whennoteIdpoints to a foreign private note.bunx vitest run src/__tests__/routes/pdfSources.test.tspasses.Other findings (not fixed in this PR)
state.messagesbut Brief answers live instate.brief— research may ignore user Brief input (quality degradation, not data loss).noteId: nullrows: hidden until sync succeeds (temporary UX gap after refactor(front+server): 個人ページ（noteId === null）概念を根絶し Page.noteId を non-null 化 (#1020) #1023 upgrade).PR #1062 itself (actions/checkout 6.0.2 → 6.0.3) contains no application logic changes.