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Bounded AI workers for repeatable operations — evidence, permissions, human release and replayable failures.

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Digital Worker Factory 🤖

Turn repeated operational work into bounded AI workflows — without hiding evidence, authority or failure.

Digital Worker Factory is a reusable runtime for AI-assisted operations. A case comes in, the worker can use only the capabilities allowed for that role, required evidence stays attached, the next hand-off is prepared, and consequential actions remain behind explicit authority.

Try the HausPilot workflow → · Portfolio →

Core principle: the model can interpret and propose. The system authorizes.

TrustReady Benchmark v1

TrustReady now has a reproducible real-repository compatibility benchmark across three structurally different architectures:

Target Architecture Assurance shape
SafeVoice Python single scoped LLM agent request authority → agent → tools → deterministic boundary → effect sink → native adversarial evidence
GitLaw TypeScript multi-entrypoint agent system scoped tool ownership → deterministic non-agent surfaces → declarative authority contracts
ProofWorker Python bounded CLI/operator CLI opt-in → guarded action → process/network effect → human release gate

Every benchmark run checks out the live target refs, records exact commits, scans all three with the same TrustReady engine, runs architecture-level negative/regression controls, fails on evidence drift, proves target worktrees remain untouched, and exports one machine-readable result plus raw evidence and a human-facing benchmark page.

View the public benchmark → · Methodology → · Target contract → · CI evidence →

The benchmark does not hardcode repository names into the assessor and does not claim whole-repository security certification. TECHNICAL_GO remains scoped to the authority/effect surfaces actually resolved at the recorded commit.

The 60-second proof

The public HausPilot case is deliberately simple and inspectable:

tenant request
   ↓
property + contractor + policy records
   ↓
classify + resolve + match capability
   ↓
prepare repair hand-off
   ↓
human review
   ↓
approve & release

Then remove a required source.

The worker stops instead of guessing, contacting anyone or claiming completion.

The public case is synthetic by design. It demonstrates the runtime and trust boundary; it is not customer production data or measured production performance.

What is implemented

  • shared AgentGateway instead of unrestricted tool execution
  • explicit capability registry and role/policy gates
  • evidence requirements before workflows advance
  • human approval for consequential writes and external actions
  • provider adapters behind the same gateway
  • tenant/request context, trust-chain checks and duplicate-execution blocking at the production boundary
  • shared Security Stack v1 for instruction provenance, protected scopes, peer identity, egress and execution budgets
  • machine-readable security-posture/v1 evidence for TrustReady and other assurance consumers
  • append-only durable audit + atomic file idempotency reference adapters
  • replayable failure cases and regression tests
  • checks for missing tools, evidence, loops and unsafe autonomy
  • declarative worker/domain specs rather than cloned one-off agents

The included filesystem adapters are deliberately a single-host reference implementation, not a claim of distributed production infrastructure. The same contracts are designed to be replaced by a transactional datastore and durable audit service in a multi-host deployment.

Shared Trust + Security Stack

The Factory now owns two reusable contracts rather than letting every worker invent its own safety model:

untrusted user / PDF / RAG / tool / peer agent
                         ↓
                      model
                (assume compromise)
                         ↓
                SECURITY STACK
 identity → tenant → protected scopes → provenance
 peer identity → supply chain → egress → budgets
                         ↓
                  allow/review/block
                         ↓
                    TRUST STACK
 source → integrity → authority → exact evidence
 derivation → human decision → audit
                         ↓
                production effect boundary

The shared adversarial gauntlet contains 40 deterministic cases across all ten OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 categories. The release invariant is zero critical impact escapes. The same contract is designed to be adopted by GitLaw, CareOS, PrüfPilot, MissionOps, SafeVoice and future workers without weakening their stricter domain rules.

See architecture/SECURITY_STACK_V1.md, architecture/TRUST_STACK_V1.md and security/security-posture.json.

This does not claim prompt injection is solved or that the Factory is completely production-secure. It proves deterministic containment boundaries and publishes the remaining gaps explicitly.

Why this matters

The goal is not “an agent that does everything.” It is to remove repeatable work while keeping the parts that matter inspectable:

input → permissions → evidence → work → human boundary → result → replay

That makes it possible to improve autonomy gradually instead of granting it by default.

Earned autonomy

SHADOW → COPILOT → HUMAN RELEASE → LIMITED AUTO → TRUSTED

A workflow should earn broader authority from real evidence: reviewed cases, correction rate, source coverage, false-completion rate, rollback and human override.

High-impact actions can remain human-only indefinitely.

Engineering proof

HausPilot includes a real-model synthetic release gate through the OpenAI Responses API plus deterministic policy checks. A published 100-case synthetic release run completed that release set without runtime errors, unsafe executions or false execution claims.

The production-boundary suite verifies fail-closed tenant context, approval/trust-chain mismatches, security-context enforcement, protected scopes, untrusted-instruction containment, secret redaction, duplicate execution and persistence of the durable reference adapters.

The Security Stack publishes a deterministic security-posture/v1 manifest generated from executable evidence. CI rebuilds it and fails if the committed proof drifts from the code/tests.

Inspect the published run → · Current CI →

These are synthetic engineering evals, not claims of real-world customer outcomes.

Pilot path

The next meaningful validation step is controlled shadow use on representative historical workflows:

  1. prepare work, but make no automatic external writes;
  2. have a human review every case;
  3. measure handling time, corrections, escalations and false completion;
  4. convert failures into regression cases;
  5. widen authority only for stable, low-risk case classes.

Current status: pilot-ready engineering candidate, not production-validated autonomous worker.

See PILOT_READINESS.md and CUSTOMER_PILOT_RUNBOOK.md.

Stack

JavaScript · Node.js · APIs · AI agents · tool contracts · policy gates · adversarial evals · CI evidence · human-in-the-loop


Built by Michael Ninh in Berlin.

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