ci: pin all GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to prevent supply-chain attacks#4190
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XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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ci: pin all GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to prevent supply-chain attacks#4190XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Summary
Pins 415 GitHub Action references across 118 workflow files to full immutable commit SHAs.
Vulnerability
All CI workflows currently use mutable version tags (
@v1,@v2,@v3,@v4,@v5) for GitHub Actions. A compromised action repository (or a tag force-push) could silently deliver malicious code into Microsoft's CI pipeline, with access to Azure credentials (azure/login), release publishing tokens, and test secrets.This is the same attack class used in the tj-actions/changed-files supply chain compromise (March 2025) which affected thousands of repositories.
Actions pinned
actions/checkoutactions/setup-pythonactions/upload-artifactactions/download-artifactactions/github-scriptactions/create-releaseactions/upload-release-assetazure/loginmicrosoft/setup-msbuildEnricoMi/publish-unit-test-result-actionirongut/CodeCoverageSummarySimenB/github-actions-cpu-coressnok/install-poetryAll pins point to the exact same code as the current tags — no behaviour change.
References