Skip to content

Security: Liquid4All/pipette-mgmt

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Security fixes target the current main branch and the latest public release. Older releases may receive fixes at maintainer discretion. Please confirm a finding against current main where you can.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue or pull request for a suspected vulnerability, and please do not disclose details publicly until a fix is available.

Report privately through either channel:

  • GitHub: open the Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability. The report stays visible only to you and the maintainers.
  • Email: send the report to support@liquid.ai.

Maintainers should acknowledge reports within 7 business days and coordinate next steps with the reporter.

A useful report includes:

  • what an attacker can do, and what they need in order to do it (network reachability, a registered client identity, an operator's storage credentials);
  • the affected version or commit;
  • steps to reproduce, ideally against a local serve instance;
  • any log output or request/response capture that shows the behavior, with keys, signatures, and tokens redacted.

Scope

This repository is the management server: the HTTP API, submission verification, scoring orchestration, and warehouse writes. Findings in the client harnesses belong to pipette-clients.

The security-relevant surfaces here are:

  • request authentication and identity: device signatures, user sign-in and keys, and the permission model (docs/authentication.md);
  • the vault, which holds customers' private model weights and serves them only to their owner's devices (Vault);
  • the submission path that accepts and stores client-supplied data;
  • the PostgreSQL database that holds the records (accounts, organizations, devices, plans, campaigns, vault records), and object-store access.

Reports we are glad to receive but do not treat as vulnerabilities in this project:

  • findings that require an operator's own database or object-store credentials, or filesystem access. That trust is assumed by the deployment model;
  • vulnerabilities in third-party crates, unless this project's use of the crate is what makes them exploitable. Report those upstream; tell us as well if a version bump here is the fix.

There aren't any published security advisories