First-party signed kind:plane plugin cdylib: the mcp plane, packaged as a droppable busbar plugin. Drop the signed tarball into plugins/.
| kind | alias | crate | busbar | license |
|---|---|---|---|---|
plane |
mcp |
busbar-plane-mcp-plugin |
1.6.0 (pinned in .busbar-ref) |
Apache-2.0 |
busbar-plane-mcp is busbar's kind: plane plugin for the Model Context Protocol. It serves
busbar's MCP endpoint (POST /mcp, its protected-resource metadata document, and the task-run
route) to MCP clients speaking revisions 2026-07-28 (stateless), 2025-11-25, 2025-06-18 and
2024-11-05 (event stream), and relays each admitted tools/call to the MCP server the operator
registered, over HTTP or a transport: stdio child. Each call is held to the operator's approvals
and the caller's grants; the server's tool list is re-verified before a call (verify-on-call).
Off by default: a document that writes neither section below never uses the plane.
tools:(the section the plane declares): one entry per registered MCP server, keyed by its id, and two reserved keys.<id>.urlor<id>.transport: stdiowithcommand,args,env,cwd: where the server is.<id>.pin:cert_spkiormtlsauthenticates the server's certificate key.local_programidentifies a host-launched stdio program as described below.unpinneddeclares no authenticity root and cannot approve tools.pinned_pubkeyis refused because this build verifies no MCP manifest signature.<id>.client_identity: busbar's client certificate and key for that server (secret references).<id>.tls.ca_cert_pem: an optional public PEM certificate bundle added to the trust roots for this HTTPS server only. The host validates it before boot or reload publishes the registration. It does not replace public roots, certificate-chain/name/validity checks,pin, or mTLS. Plaintext HTTP and stdio rejecttls:rather than silently ignoring it. An absenttls:keeps existing trust unchanged.client_identitystays at its existing sibling location; there is no nestedtls.client_identityspelling. The bundle does not widenallow_privateor another server's trust. Changing it on reload changes new connections; retained work keeps its previous generation's scoped trust until it ends.<id>.tools_allow,prompts_allow,resources_allow,resource_templates_allow: what it may publish.<id>.verify_ttl,timeout,aud,grants,allow_private,token_exchange,max_input_required_rounds,max_caller_ask_rounds,sampling_bounds,upstream_credentials,hooks: the per-server rules.tools.hooks: hooks attached to every server;tools.upstream_credentials: own: the default credential mode.passthroughis refused both here and per server: upstream access must use the server's own credential or its configured token exchange.
mcp:(owned beside it, and it selects the plane on its own): the endpoint block.canonical_uri: the endpoint's RFC 8707 resource URI (its path is/mcp).authorization_servers: the issuers that may mint tokens for it (at least one).scopes_supported: advisory scopes for the metadata document.allowed_origins: browser origins admitted beyond loopback.
An unknown key in either section is refused. validate judges both; a reload judges mcp: again
and refuses a malformed one, but keeps the endpoint open read.
Each HTTP member may enable the 2026-01-26 Apps extension
with apps.enabled: true. It requires upstream_credentials: connection and the member's
OAuth registration. Downstream clients negotiate io.modelcontextprotocol/ui in an HTTP
session's initialize capabilities; stateless and line clients keep the model projection.
The gateway advertises only configured types the client supports. Defaults are:
apps:
enabled: false
spec_version: 2026-01-26
mime_types: [text/html;profile=mcp-app]
max_resource_bytes: 1048576
allow_legacy_resource_meta: false
resources:
ui://example/view:
ui: {} # Exact approved resource _meta.ui; absent CSP has restrictive host defaults.
# digest: sha256:<digest of decoded HTML bytes> # Optional immutable content pin.Put approved tool metadata in tools_allow.<tool>.meta, matching the upstream _meta.
meta.ui.resourceUri must name an exact entry in apps.resources; local resources_allow
and URI templates do not serve Apps HTML. meta.ui.visibility defaults to [model, app].
An Apps session receives all authorized tools and their metadata. Ordinary clients never see
or call app-only tools. The authenticated downstream host must distinguish app-origin calls
from model-origin calls and enforce same-server app visibility; the gateway cannot establish
that distinction from a standard tools/call or a caller-supplied origin flag.
Apps approvals use a domain-separated version-one SHA-256 digest over the definition, effective visibility, resource identity and full metadata. Legacy definition-only approvals cannot approve Apps tools. Tool metadata drift fails the existing trust check. Existing non-Apps tool hashes remain unchanged. The deprecated flat resource key is accepted only with the explicit compatibility setting; conflicting old/new resource identities fail.
UI resource addresses are opaque, session-specific ui://busbar/... mappings. The same
upstream URI on two members, users, capability profiles or approval generations remains
separate. Dynamic reads use MCP resources/read through the member's governed per-user
connection, recheck authorization after the response, and preserve HTML bytes and approved
CSP/permissions. Resource policies admit exact HTTPS/WSS origins and supported permission
names; drift, unsupported MIME, invalid base64, non-UTF-8 or oversized content is refused.
Resources without a content pin carry _meta["io.busbar/mutable"]: true. UI-only resources
are discovered through tool metadata and may be omitted from resources/list.
The gateway does not execute HTML. Browser rendering, HTML interpretation and sandbox/CSP enforcement remain the host's responsibility. Protocol fixture coverage is not a claim of interoperability with an external rendering host.
A transport: stdio server can use pin.mechanism: local_program. Its pin.key must equal
its configured absolute command path exactly, and it must configure an explicit absolute
cwd. This mechanism is confined to the host-owned program need; an HTTP registration cannot
use it. Stdio refuses cert_spki and mtls because no TLS handshake authenticates their keys.
The host runs the command directly with the admitted arguments and a cleared environment,
resolves only its admitted environment references, and applies the admitted working directory.
The host supplies the first successful lease head only after it has observed a live program
handle from a successful spawn under that same ticket and checked supplier grant. The plane
requires one canonical generation, program-instance, and base64 program-identity field
from that head before sending a greeting or observing tools. A governed call or child reply
opens with the expected checked incarnation and generation; the host compares them against the
current live program before flushing any request body. A replacement or respawn refuses that
open instead of receiving bytes owed to the earlier child. The plane also validates the actual
call lease head before accepting its response. The identity
contains only the configured command path. The private grant binds arguments, environment,
and working directory; no public recipe hash or secret fingerprint is emitted. Missing,
duplicate, unsuccessful, noncanonical, mismatched, repeated, or retired receipts refuse the
exchange. Program incarnations are nonzero and never reused within a live host process; changing the launch recipe creates
a new incarnation, so greeting and request caches cannot reuse an earlier recipe's generation.
A rooted child reply additionally requires the originating plane's locally owned live work handle;
a durable work row or a sealed numeric pair cannot transfer child custody to a fresh plane or
host process.
This authenticates the operator's configured launch under the host grant. It assumes the selected stdio carrier preserves the host's framing semantics. It does not attest executable bytes, an inode, signatures, script contents, or arbitrary malicious carrier payloads. Keep the executable and its inputs under the operator's control. Tool content still requires the usual observation and approval; a valid launch receipt grants no tool approval on its own.
Malformed endpoint URIs, protocol headers and tool parameter-header annotations are refused before dispatch. The destination policy checks both tool arguments and URL-bearing replies to relayed asks. Schema references must resolve inside the registered schema; an exhausted inspection budget refuses the request rather than inspecting only part of it.
Stdio servers must return a valid initialization result for a supported session revision or, after an initialization error, valid discovery advertising the supported modern revision before receiving tool requests. Negotiation currently tries initialization first to preserve supported session servers that do not answer requests before initialization. This differs from the modern specification's discovery-first recommendation; a modern server that does not answer initialization cannot be negotiated by this path. A partial host write is resumed from its remaining bytes.
Local rendered responses are limited to 64 MiB, with bounded normalization work. Task-record listings retain at most 16 MiB and 16,384 rows per lookup. The local approval replay ledger holds 65,536 live nonces; when full it refuses new approvals until entries expire, without forgetting previously spent approvals.
| code | slug | when |
|---|---|---|
| 7108 | mcp-legacy-stream-ungoverned |
a 2024-11-05 event stream opened while the deployment runs the ungoverned chain (sessions unisolated); raised once per instance, and audited by the host |
cargo build --release -p busbar-plane-mcp-plugincargo test --workspace --lockedApache-2.0. See LICENSE.