From 6c963110e52aba727c297be48476bf820325ad3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Istora Mandiri <1696942+IstoraMandiri@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 14:34:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Add 1559 debate article --- .../index.md | 84 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+) create mode 100644 content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md diff --git a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7823e6efc --- /dev/null +++ b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +--- +title: "The ETC Fee Market Debate: Navigating the Path Forward" +date: 2025-12-16 +author: Cody Burns, Diego López León, Istora Mandiri, Chris Mercer +contributors: ["realcodywburns", "IstoraMandiri", "chris-mercer"] +tags: ["announcement", "development", "hardfork"] +--- + +The Ethereum Classic community stands at a crossroads. Two distinct proposals for implementing EIP-1559-style fee market mechanisms have emerged, each representing different philosophies about how ETC should evolve. Both paths offer compelling visions for the network's future, and the coming months will see the community work through these options together. + +## The Fee Market Question + +EIP-1559 introduced a dynamic fee market with a base fee that adjusts algorithmically based on network demand, improving fee predictability by replacing the first-price auction model. + +The key question for ETC is not whether to adopt this mechanism, but what to do with the basefee once collected. On Ethereum, basefees are burned. For Ethereum Classic, with its commitment to a fixed monetary supply under [ECIP-1017](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1017), the community must decide how to handle these fees in alignment with ETC's principles. + +Two proposals have been submitted for consideration. Each offers a coherent vision with distinct tradeoffs. + +## Two Proposals, Two Approaches + +### The Olympia Upgrade (ECIPs 1111-1114) + +Olympia, introduced by Cody Burns and Chris Mercer, proposes redirecting basefees to a protocol-level treasury governed by on-chain mechanisms: + +- **[ECIP-1111](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1111)**: Activates EIP-1559 and redirects basefees to a treasury contract +- **[ECIP-1112](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1112)**: Defines the on-chain treasury contract +- **[ECIP-1113](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1113)**: Establishes a modular on-chain governance framework +- **[ECIP-1114](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1114)**: Creates the Olympia Improvement Process (OIP) for funding proposals + +#### The case for Olympia + +Proponents observe that ETC has faced challenges funding core development and infrastructure. Some view historical reliance on donations and ad-hoc coordination as unsustainable, and see Olympia as creating a self-sustaining funding mechanism native to the protocol. + +The treasury is designed to be governed entirely on-chain through smart contracts. Disbursements would execute automatically after successful votes, which supporters say ensures decisions are transparent and follow predetermined rules. + +Proponents argue that empowering ETC holders to govern fund allocation aligns incentives between those who hold value in the network and those who decide how protocol revenue is spent. They suggest the OIP (Olympia Improvement Process) would open funding access to all contributors equally. + +Some believe that on-chain governance, properly designed, enhances decentralization by replacing opaque off-chain decision-making with transparent on-chain processes. + +### ECIP-1120: Basefee Market with Miner Rewards + +[ECIP-1120](https://github.com/ethereumclassic/ECIPs/pull/547), authored by Istora Mandiri and Diego López León, proposes distributing basefees directly to miners through a protocol-native mechanism. + +The proposal introduces a backward-looking distribution system that smooths fee payments across ancestor blocks, deriving distribution entirely from existing block header data without additional state management. + +#### The case for ECIP-1120 + +Proponents argue that proof-of-work security depends on adequate miner compensation. As block subsidies decline under ECIP-1017, some view transaction fees as increasingly important for maintaining the security budget. ECIP-1120 directs basefees to those who secure the network. + +The proposal avoids introducing governance mechanisms at the consensus layer. Supporters suggest that keeping fee distribution protocol-native and stateless minimizes attack surface, reduces complexity, and sidesteps difficult questions of voter participation and governance capture. + +Authors contend the smoothing mechanism reduces fee manipulation opportunities and provides more consistent miner rewards, potentially making revenue more predictable for mining infrastructure investment. + +Some believe the protocol layer should remain minimal and focused on consensus, that funding decisions are better handled through existing coordination, and that simplicity itself contributes to security and longevity. + +## The ECIP Process + +Ethereum Classic has no foundation dictating technical direction. Decisions emerge through the [ECIP process](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org), where proposals are submitted, reviewed, debated, and refined through community participation. + +Neither proposal is final at this stage. Both remain open for discussion, revision, and community input. + +## Community Engagement + +Both proposals deserve thorough examination on technical merits, philosophical alignment with ETC's principles, and practical implementation considerations. + +The ETC community holds regular calls where proposals like these are discussed openly. Check the [community calls repository](https://github.com/ethereumclassic/community-calls) for schedules and recordings. + +Questions to consider: + +- What is the appropriate level of protocol complexity for ETC? +- How should the network ensure long-term security as block subsidies decline? +- What mechanisms, if any, should exist for coordinating development funding? + +## A Level Playing Field + +Both proposals have thoughtful authors behind them. The strength of arguments, quality of research, and breadth of community support will inform the outcome. + +Those who favor one approach may find it valuable to articulate why reasonable people might favor the other. + +## Rough Consensus + +Perfect unanimity is rarely achieved in open communities. The goal is for voices to be heard, concerns to be addressed, and the community to move forward together when a direction emerges. + +Both proposals are in development and open for review. Examine both, ask questions, and participate in the discussion. Your participation matters. From 147ab467b7b582d5b8cb92c083213bd038d01c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Istora Mandiri <1696942+IstoraMandiri@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 18:38:53 +0400 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] add diega as contributor --- content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md index 7823e6efc..0e73b63f8 100644 --- a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md +++ b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: "The ETC Fee Market Debate: Navigating the Path Forward" date: 2025-12-16 author: Cody Burns, Diego López León, Istora Mandiri, Chris Mercer -contributors: ["realcodywburns", "IstoraMandiri", "chris-mercer"] +contributors: ["realcodywburns", "IstoraMandiri", "chris-mercer", "diega"] tags: ["announcement", "development", "hardfork"] --- From 9d31b77e8ef307ef9bcc4e16629f529e874f86a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Istora Mandiri <1696942+IstoraMandiri@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 06:37:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Add 1115 to fee ebate article --- content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md index 0e73b63f8..ad720dde4 100644 --- a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md +++ b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Two proposals have been submitted for consideration. Each offers a coherent visi ## Two Proposals, Two Approaches -### The Olympia Upgrade (ECIPs 1111-1114) +### The Olympia Upgrade (ECIPs 1111-1115) Olympia, introduced by Cody Burns and Chris Mercer, proposes redirecting basefees to a protocol-level treasury governed by on-chain mechanisms: @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Olympia, introduced by Cody Burns and Chris Mercer, proposes redirecting basefee - **[ECIP-1112](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1112)**: Defines the on-chain treasury contract - **[ECIP-1113](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1113)**: Establishes a modular on-chain governance framework - **[ECIP-1114](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1114)**: Creates the Olympia Improvement Process (OIP) for funding proposals +- **[ECIP-1115](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1115)**: Introduces optional L-curve smoothing to distribute a governance-defined portion of basefees to miners #### The case for Olympia @@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ Proponents argue that empowering ETC holders to govern fund allocation aligns in Some believe that on-chain governance, properly designed, enhances decentralization by replacing opaque off-chain decision-making with transparent on-chain processes. +ECIP-1115 offers a middle ground within the Olympia framework. Rather than directing all basefees exclusively to the treasury, governance can allocate a portion to miners through a smoothing mechanism. This allows the network to balance treasury funding with miner incentives, with the split adjustable through the OIP process without requiring hard forks. + ### ECIP-1120: Basefee Market with Miner Rewards [ECIP-1120](https://github.com/ethereumclassic/ECIPs/pull/547), authored by Istora Mandiri and Diego López León, proposes distributing basefees directly to miners through a protocol-native mechanism. From 497942316f03ed3124d8c17dd304e95543c37ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Istora Mandiri <1696942+IstoraMandiri@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 08:54:36 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Remove Chris as Author of fee market debate article --- content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md index ad720dde4..6b0fdcad2 100644 --- a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md +++ b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ --- title: "The ETC Fee Market Debate: Navigating the Path Forward" date: 2025-12-16 -author: Cody Burns, Diego López León, Istora Mandiri, Chris Mercer -contributors: ["realcodywburns", "IstoraMandiri", "chris-mercer", "diega"] +author: Cody Burns, Diego López León, Istora Mandiri +contributors: ["realcodywburns", "IstoraMandiri", "diega"] tags: ["announcement", "development", "hardfork"] --- From 7b900eda11963b6b674e633a52cafeb4cfc1e512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Istora Mandiri <1696942+IstoraMandiri@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 10:14:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Revise fee market debate article for neutrality and completeness Adds disclaimer, expands Olympia ECIPs (1115-1119), adds ECIP-1121 as common ground, balances third-party links, emphasizes deliberation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) --- .../index.md | 79 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md index 6b0fdcad2..e5c9351a5 100644 --- a/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md +++ b/content/blog/2025-12-16-the-etc-fee-market-debate/index.md @@ -1,87 +1,88 @@ --- title: "The ETC Fee Market Debate: Navigating the Path Forward" -date: 2025-12-16 +date: 2026-03-30 author: Cody Burns, Diego López León, Istora Mandiri contributors: ["realcodywburns", "IstoraMandiri", "diega"] tags: ["announcement", "development", "hardfork"] --- -The Ethereum Classic community stands at a crossroads. Two distinct proposals for implementing EIP-1559-style fee market mechanisms have emerged, each representing different philosophies about how ETC should evolve. Both paths offer compelling visions for the network's future, and the coming months will see the community work through these options together. +*This article summarizes active proposals and the arguments made by their respective authors. Inclusion does not constitute endorsement of any proposal. Readers are encouraged to review each ECIP directly and form their own conclusions.* ## The Fee Market Question EIP-1559 introduced a dynamic fee market with a base fee that adjusts algorithmically based on network demand, improving fee predictability by replacing the first-price auction model. -The key question for ETC is not whether to adopt this mechanism, but what to do with the basefee once collected. On Ethereum, basefees are burned. For Ethereum Classic, with its commitment to a fixed monetary supply under [ECIP-1017](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1017), the community must decide how to handle these fees in alignment with ETC's principles. +There is general agreement within the ETC community that adopting this mechanism is desirable. The remaining question is what to do with the basefee once collected. On Ethereum, basefees are burned. For Ethereum Classic, with its commitment to a fixed monetary supply under [ECIP-1017](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1017), the community must decide how to handle these fees in alignment with ETC's principles. -Two proposals have been submitted for consideration. Each offers a coherent vision with distinct tradeoffs. +Two broad approaches have been proposed. Each offers a vision with distinct tradeoffs. -## Two Proposals, Two Approaches +## The Olympia Approach (ECIPs 1111-1119) -### The Olympia Upgrade (ECIPs 1111-1115) - -Olympia, introduced by Cody Burns and Chris Mercer, proposes redirecting basefees to a protocol-level treasury governed by on-chain mechanisms: +Olympia, introduced by Cody Burns and Chris Mercer, proposes redirecting basefees to a treasury governed by on-chain mechanisms. The suite encompasses: - **[ECIP-1111](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1111)**: Activates EIP-1559 and redirects basefees to a treasury contract - **[ECIP-1112](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1112)**: Defines the on-chain treasury contract - **[ECIP-1113](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1113)**: Establishes a modular on-chain governance framework - **[ECIP-1114](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1114)**: Creates the Olympia Improvement Process (OIP) for funding proposals - **[ECIP-1115](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1115)**: Introduces optional L-curve smoothing to distribute a governance-defined portion of basefees to miners +- **[ECIP-1116](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1116)**: Proposes a 95/5 basefee split between miners and the treasury +- **[ECIP-1117](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1117)**: Introduces futarchy (prediction-market-based) governance for treasury decisions +- **[ECIP-1118](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1118)**: Defines streaming disbursements and funding mechanisms for governance infrastructure +- **[ECIP-1119](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1119)**: Establishes a sanctions compliance oracle for treasury withdrawals + +### The case for Olympia + +Proponents observe that ETC has faced challenges funding core development and infrastructure. Some view historical reliance on donations and ad-hoc coordination as unsustainable, and see Olympia as creating a self-sustaining funding mechanism. -#### The case for Olympia +The treasury is designed to be governed entirely on-chain through smart contracts. Disbursements would execute automatically after successful votes, which supporters say ensures decisions are transparent and follow predetermined rules. Supporters suggest the OIP (Olympia Improvement Process) would open funding access to all contributors equally. -Proponents observe that ETC has faced challenges funding core development and infrastructure. Some view historical reliance on donations and ad-hoc coordination as unsustainable, and see Olympia as creating a self-sustaining funding mechanism native to the protocol. +Proponents argue that on-chain governance enhances decentralization by replacing opaque off-chain decision-making with transparent on-chain processes. -The treasury is designed to be governed entirely on-chain through smart contracts. Disbursements would execute automatically after successful votes, which supporters say ensures decisions are transparent and follow predetermined rules. +ECIP-1115 and ECIP-1116 offer flexibility within the Olympia framework. Rather than directing all basefees exclusively to the treasury, governance can allocate a portion to miners, allowing the network to balance treasury funding with miner incentives. This split would be adjustable through the OIP process without requiring hard forks. -Proponents argue that empowering ETC holders to govern fund allocation aligns incentives between those who hold value in the network and those who decide how protocol revenue is spent. They suggest the OIP (Olympia Improvement Process) would open funding access to all contributors equally. +*The following third-party resources advocate for the Olympia approach. They are provided for informational purposes and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement:* -Some believe that on-chain governance, properly designed, enhances decentralization by replacing opaque off-chain decision-making with transparent on-chain processes. +- [olympiadao.org](https://olympiadao.org) - Olympia governance and treasury infrastructure +- [ethereumclassicdao.org](https://ethereumclassicdao.org) - Ethereum Classic DAO LLC -ECIP-1115 offers a middle ground within the Olympia framework. Rather than directing all basefees exclusively to the treasury, governance can allocate a portion to miners through a smoothing mechanism. This allows the network to balance treasury funding with miner incentives, with the split adjustable through the OIP process without requiring hard forks. +## ECIP-1120: Basefee Distribution to Miners -### ECIP-1120: Basefee Market with Miner Rewards +[ECIP-1120](https://github.com/ethereumclassic/ECIPs/pull/547), authored by Istora Mandiri and Diego López León, proposes distributing basefees directly to miners. -[ECIP-1120](https://github.com/ethereumclassic/ECIPs/pull/547), authored by Istora Mandiri and Diego López León, proposes distributing basefees directly to miners through a protocol-native mechanism. +The proposal introduces a backward-looking distribution system that algorithmically smooths fee payments across ancestor blocks, deriving distribution objectively from existing block header data without additional state management. -The proposal introduces a backward-looking distribution system that smooths fee payments across ancestor blocks, deriving distribution entirely from existing block header data without additional state management. +### The case for ECIP-1120 -#### The case for ECIP-1120 +Proponents argue that proof-of-work security depends on adequate miner compensation. As block subsidies decline under ECIP-1017, some view transaction fees, though currently a small fraction of miner income, as increasingly important for maintaining the security budget long-term. ECIP-1120 directs basefees to those who secure the network. -Proponents argue that proof-of-work security depends on adequate miner compensation. As block subsidies decline under ECIP-1017, some view transaction fees as increasingly important for maintaining the security budget. ECIP-1120 directs basefees to those who secure the network. +The proposal avoids introducing governance mechanisms at the consensus layer. Supporters suggest the protocol layer should remain minimal and focused on consensus, that this minimizes attack surface and complexity, and that simplicity itself contributes to security and longevity. -The proposal avoids introducing governance mechanisms at the consensus layer. Supporters suggest that keeping fee distribution protocol-native and stateless minimizes attack surface, reduces complexity, and sidesteps difficult questions of voter participation and governance capture. +Opponents of the treasury approach have raised broader concerns. Some argue that embedding a treasury at the protocol layer changes the rules agreed upon in ETC's founding documents, breaks protocol neutrality, increases the network's vulnerability to capture, and introduces additional technical, legal, and political risk. -Authors contend the smoothing mechanism reduces fee manipulation opportunities and provides more consistent miner rewards, potentially making revenue more predictable for mining infrastructure investment. +*The following third-party resources advocate for ECIP-1120 or against the Olympia approach. They are provided for informational purposes and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement:* -Some believe the protocol layer should remain minimal and focused on consensus, that funding decisions are better handled through existing coordination, and that simplicity itself contributes to security and longevity. +- [ecip1120.dev](https://ecip1120.dev) - ECIP-1120 proposal information +- [nolympia.dev](https://nolympia.dev) - A community petition opposing the Olympia treasury proposal -## The ECIP Process +## The Path Forward -Ethereum Classic has no foundation dictating technical direction. Decisions emerge through the [ECIP process](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org), where proposals are submitted, reviewed, debated, and refined through community participation. +### Common Ground: ECIP-1121 -Neither proposal is final at this stage. Both remain open for discussion, revision, and community input. +Regardless of how the fee market debate is resolved, [ECIP-1121](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org/ECIPs/ecip-1121) proposes an execution client specification alignment that is broadly non-controversial. It brings ETC clients up to date with recent Ethereum execution-layer improvements such as gas accounting, cryptographic precompiles, and memory optimizations, while explicitly excluding contentious items like fee market governance and proof-of-stake changes. This upgrade can proceed independently of the treasury debate. -## Community Engagement +### The Importance of Deliberation -Both proposals deserve thorough examination on technical merits, philosophical alignment with ETC's principles, and practical implementation considerations. +Ethereum Classic exists because of a community that refused to accept a rushed, contentious change to protocol rules. That history carries a responsibility: changes to ETC's economic model deserve the highest standard of scrutiny, and the cost of getting it wrong far outweighs the cost of taking more time. + +Neither proposal is final. Both remain open for discussion, revision, and community input. The [ECIP process](https://ecips.ethereumclassic.org) exists to ensure decisions emerge through broad participation rather than narrow consensus. The ETC community holds regular calls where proposals like these are discussed openly. Check the [community calls repository](https://github.com/ethereumclassic/community-calls) for schedules and recordings. -Questions to consider: +Questions worth considering: - What is the appropriate level of protocol complexity for ETC? - How should the network ensure long-term security as block subsidies decline? - What mechanisms, if any, should exist for coordinating development funding? +- What are the risks of acting too quickly, or too slowly? -## A Level Playing Field - -Both proposals have thoughtful authors behind them. The strength of arguments, quality of research, and breadth of community support will inform the outcome. - -Those who favor one approach may find it valuable to articulate why reasonable people might favor the other. - -## Rough Consensus - -Perfect unanimity is rarely achieved in open communities. The goal is for voices to be heard, concerns to be addressed, and the community to move forward together when a direction emerges. - -Both proposals are in development and open for review. Examine both, ask questions, and participate in the discussion. Your participation matters. +Both proposals have thoughtful authors behind them. Examine both, ask questions, and participate in the discussion. Your participation matters.