🟠 [High] GitPython: Incomplete Unsafe_git_clone_options Denylist Omits --Template Enabling Arbitrary Command Execution via Clone Hooks

[it-integrations]

🔍 DefectDojo Finding

Field	Value
Severity	High
Product	Latch/connectedhomeip
Finding ID	#14077
CVE	GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf
Component	GitPython
File	scripts/requirements.txt

📋 Description

Summary

GitPython's unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template. git clone --template=<dir> copies <dir>/hooks/ into the new repository and runs them (post-checkout fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration.

Root Cause

base.py:145-152 defines unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"] — --template is absent. The guard candidate ['--template'] passes check_unsafe_options (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes post-checkout at checkout time. git's protocol.allow/GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL do not gate --template; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, /tmp, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.

Proof of Concept

# attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)

Attack Chain

1. Setup: attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
2. Entry: Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>'). Guard: check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options). Bypass proof: --template not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate ['--template'], no error).
3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes post-checkout at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate ['--template'] passed with no error; staged post-checkout hook executed during clone_from, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (--template is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Add --template (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to unsafe_git_clone_options.

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Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

🔗 References

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf
gitpython-developers/GitPython#2180
gitpython-developers/GitPython@ffcb535
https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54
GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf

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